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2069124	HK0000069689	AIA Group Limited	Asia	Hong Kong	22/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2082587	HK0001200002	Zijin Gold International Co., Ltd.	Asia	Hong Kong	29/05/2026	Annual	Against	7,8
2074658	HK0688002218	China Overseas Land & Investment Ltd.	Asia	Hong Kong	24/06/2026	Annual	Against	7 3b
2091292	HK0688002218	China Overseas Land & Investment Ltd.	Asia	Hong Kong	24/06/2026	Special	All For	
2072503	JP3422950000	Seven & i Holdings Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	27/05/2026	Annual	Against	4.1
2087581	JP3271400008	Credit Saison Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	17/06/2026	Annual	Against	2.12 2.1,2.2
2085217	JP3633400001	Toyota Motor Corp.	Asia	Japan	17/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2085236	JP3735400008	NTT, Inc.	Asia	Japan	18/06/2026	Annual	Against	7,9 1.1,1.2
2089703	JP3933800009	LY Corp.	Asia	Japan	19/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2088158	JP3475350009	Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	22/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2090359	JP3866800000	Panasonic Holdings Corp.	Asia	Japan	22/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2090327	JP3762600009	Nomura Holdings, Inc.	Asia	Japan	23/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2087080	JP3547670004	PERSOL Holdings Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	23/06/2026	Annual	Against	3.6,4.1
2089105	JP3788600009	Hitachi Ltd.	Asia	Japan	24/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2087610	JP3134800006	IHI Corp.	Asia	Japan	24/06/2026	Annual	Against	2.1
2090349	JP3902400005	Mitsubishi Electric Corp.	Asia	Japan	24/06/2026	Annual	Against	2.8
2089704	JP3500610005	Resona Holdings, Inc.	Asia	Japan	24/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.1
2089103	JP3463000004	Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	24/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2086568	JP3386450005	ENEOS Holdings, Inc.	Asia	Japan	25/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2087082	JP3539220008	T&D Holdings, Inc.	Asia	Japan	25/06/2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2
2090365	JP3814000000	FUJIFILM Holdings Corp.	Asia	Japan	26/06/2026	Annual	Against	2.7
2089734	JP3899600005	Mitsubishi Estate Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26/06/2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2
2089731	JP3900000005	Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26/06/2026	Annual	Against	2.1,2.2 2.5,2.6
2089770	JP3885780001	Mizuho Financial Group, Inc.	Asia	Japan	26/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.5 1.9,1.11
2091270	JP3409000001	Sumitomo Realty & Development Co., Ltd.	Asia	Japan	26/06/2026	Annual	Against	2.6,2.8 2.1,2.2
2090410	JP3818000006	Fujitsu Ltd.	Asia	Japan	29/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2089780	JP3914400001	Murata Manufacturing Co. Ltd.	Asia	Japan	29/06/2026	Annual	Against	3.2
2077794	SGXZ53070850	Hafnia Ltd.	Asia	Singapore	26/05/2026	Annual	Against	2.a,3 8
2048984	TW0002421005	Sunonwealth Electric Machine Industry Co., Ltd.	Asia	Taiwan	25/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2045720	TW0006669005	Wiwynn Corp.	Asia	Taiwan	25/05/2026	Annual	Against	1.7,1.9 1.6 1.1 6 2
2049299	TW0002337003	Macronix International Co., Ltd.	Asia	Taiwan	27/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2051048	TW0002357001	ASUSTek Computer, Inc.	Asia	Taiwan	29/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2038964	TW0002317005	Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd.	Asia	Taiwan	29/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2045723	TW0002454006	MediaTek, Inc.	Asia	Taiwan	29/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2050970	TW0003044004	Tripod Technology Corp.	Asia	Taiwan	29/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2040030	TW0002330008	Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., Ltd.	Asia	Taiwan	04/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2053506	TW0002886009	Mega Financial Holding Co., Ltd.	Asia	Taiwan	18/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2059505	TW0003711008	ASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd.	Asia	Taiwan	24/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2042868	AU000000RIO1	Rio Tinto Limited	Australia & New Zealand	Australia	06/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2046623	BMG2004J1036	Carnival Corporation Ltd.	Emerging Markets	Bermuda	17/04/2026	Annual	Against	11 12,13
2047008	BMG2004J1036	Carnival Corporation Ltd.	Emerging Markets	Bermuda	17/04/2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For	
2057624	BMG0450A1053	Arch Capital Group Ltd.	Emerging Markets	Bermuda	05/05/2026	Annual	Against	1a
2055924	BMG491BT1088	Invesco Ltd.	Emerging Markets	Bermuda	21/05/2026	Annual	Against	1.1 1.10
2080350	BMG5320C1082	KunLun Energy Company Limited	Emerging Markets	Bermuda	28/05/2026	Annual	Against	3B 6,8
2059713	BRCPFEACNOR0	CPFL Energia SA	Emerging Markets	Brazil	29/04/2026	Annual	Abstain Against	3.1,3.2 4 5
2059714	BRCPFEACNOR0	CPFL Energia SA	Emerging Markets	Brazil	29/04/2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	Against	1
2060322	BRASAIACNOR0	Sendas Distribuidora SA	Emerging Markets	Brazil	29/04/2026	Annual	Against	3
2060290	BRASAIACNOR0	Sendas Distribuidora SA	Emerging Markets	Brazil	29/04/2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For	
2061634	BRCYREACNOR7	Cyrela Brazil Realty SA Empreendimentos e Particip	Emerging Markets	Brazil	30/04/2026	Annual	Abstain Against	5,8,9.1,9.2,9.3,9.4,9.5,9.6,9. 7,9.8,9.9,9.10,10 7 11 6

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2061254	BRCYREACNOR7	Cyrela Brazil Realty SA Empreendimentos e Particip	Emerging Markets	Brazil	30/04/2026	Annual	Abstain Against	5,8,9.1,9.2,9.3,9.4,9.5,9.6,9.7,9.8,9.9,9.10,10 7 11 6
2061694	BRITSAACNPR7	Itausa SA	Emerging Markets	Brazil	30/04/2026	Annual	Abstain Against	1 2
2065236	KYG217651051	CK Hutchison Holdings Limited	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	27/04/2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For	
2070293	KYG217651051	CK Hutchison Holdings Limited	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	21/05/2026	Annual	Against	3d
2077049	KYG3066L1014	ENN Energy Holdings Limited	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	27/05/2026	Annual	Against	4 3a4 3a3 3a2
2080199	KYG9829N1025	Xinyi Solar Holdings Limited	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	29/05/2026	Annual	Against	3A1 7
2084897	KYG2108Y1052	China Resources Land Limited	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	09/06/2026	Annual	Against	3.4,3.6,3.7 4 6,7
2074628	KYG9830F1063	Yadea Group Holdings Ltd.	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	17/06/2026	Annual	Against	4 5A,5C
2085867	KYG6427A1022	NetEase, Inc.	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	23/06/2026	Annual	Against	5a,5b 1b,1d,1e 3 2
2093635	KYG596691041	Meituan	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	26/06/2026	Annual	Against	7
2090197	KYG9066F1019	Trip.com Group Limited	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	30/06/2026	Annual	Against	1
2060885	CL0000000100	Cencosud SA	Emerging Markets	Chile	24/04/2026	Annual	Against	k
2050772	CNE100006WS8	Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Ltd.	Emerging Markets	China	03/04/2026	Annual	Against	9,11
2061071	CNE000000PY4	Yutong Bus Co., Ltd.	Emerging Markets	China	27/04/2026	Annual	Against	10.1 10.2 7 6
2058442	CNE000000QS4	Beijing New Building Materials Public Ltd. Co.	Emerging Markets	China	28/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2057542	CNE100003F19	WuXi AppTec Co., Ltd.	Emerging Markets	China	28/04/2026	Annual	Against	6.1 7.5 5 18
2057972	CNE100003F19	WuXi AppTec Co., Ltd.	Emerging Markets	China	28/04/2026	Special	All For	
2067657	CNE1000002H1	China Construction Bank Corporation	Emerging Markets	China	29/04/2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	Against	3
2071671	CNE100001765	Henan Mingtai Al. Industrial Co., Ltd.	Emerging Markets	China	11/05/2026	Annual	Against	9.1,9.2,9.3,9.4,9.5,9.6,9.7,9.8
2058810	CNE1000003X6	Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd.	Emerging Markets	China	20/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2073888	CNE000000QN5	Xiamen Xiangyu Co., Ltd.	Emerging Markets	China	22/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2078602	CNE1000002G3	China Communications Services Corp. Ltd.	Emerging Markets	China	28/05/2026	Annual	Against	4,5
2078775	CNE1000002G3	China Communications Services Corp. Ltd.	Emerging Markets	China	28/05/2026	Special	All For	
2085223	CNE100006M58	Midea Group Co., Ltd.	Emerging Markets	China	05/06/2026	Annual	Against	7 16
2090096	CNE1000004L9	Weichai Power Co., Ltd.	Emerging Markets	China	22/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2059280	CNE1000048K8	Haier Smart Home Co., Ltd.	Emerging Markets	China	24/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2059449	CNE1000048K8	Haier Smart Home Co., Ltd.	Emerging Markets	China	24/06/2026	Special	All For	
2092133	CNE1000002M1	China Merchants Bank Co., Ltd.	Emerging Markets	China	25/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2093560	CNE100000593	PICC Property and Casualty Company Limited	Emerging Markets	China	25/06/2026	Annual	Against	11
2094043	CNE1000002H1	China Construction Bank Corporation	Emerging Markets	China	26/06/2026	Annual	Against	10.01
2092954	CNE100001YQ9	Huatai Securities Co., Ltd.	Emerging Markets	China	26/06/2026	Annual	Against	7 17
2078148	CNE0000001D4	Gree Electric Appliances, Inc. of Zhuhai	Emerging Markets	China	30/06/2026	Annual	Against	10 7 13,14 15
2046051	AN8068571086	SLB Limited	Emerging Markets	Curacao	08/04/2026	Annual	Against	1.3
2044494	HU0000061726	OTP Bank Nyrt	Emerging Markets	Hungary	17/04/2026	Annual	Against	17,23 14,16,18,24 8,27 28
2044488	HU0000123096	Chemical Works of Gedeon Richter Plc	Emerging Markets	Hungary	29/04/2026	Annual	Against	6
2059450	INE040A01034	HDFC Bank Limited	Emerging Markets	India	26/04/2026	Special	All For	
2057431	INE062A01020	State Bank of India	Emerging Markets	India	15/05/2026	Special	Against	1.3,1.5,1.6,1.8
2070118	INE002S01010	Mahanagar Gas Limited	Emerging Markets	India	19/05/2026	Special	Against	1
2071117	INE040A01034	HDFC Bank Limited	Emerging Markets	India	20/05/2026	Special	Against	1
2075583	INE009A01021	Infosys Limited	Emerging Markets	India	24/05/2026	Special	All For	
2083422	INE860A01027	HCL Technologies Limited	Emerging Markets	India	10/06/2026	Special	All For	
2085255	INE062A01020	State Bank of India	Emerging Markets	India	18/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2092834	INE009A01021	Infosys Limited	Emerging Markets	India	23/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2046463	ID1000118201	PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk	Emerging Markets	Indonesia	10/04/2026	Annual	Against	7
2054794	ID1000095003	PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk	Emerging Markets	Indonesia	29/04/2026	Annual	Against	7,10
2080942	ID1000129000	PT Telkom Indonesia (Persero) Tbk	Emerging Markets	Indonesia	08/06/2026	Annual	Against	7,8
2086622	ID1000115306	PT Ciputra Development Tbk	Emerging Markets	Indonesia	26/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2049188	MXP001661018	Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste SA de CV	Emerging Markets	Mexico	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	3b6,3b7,3b8,3c1,3d2,3d3
2057076	MXP370711014	Grupo Financiero Banorte SAB de CV	Emerging Markets	Mexico	23/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2061840	MXCFFU000001	Fibra Uno Administracion SA de CV	Emerging Markets	Mexico	30/04/2026	Annual	Against	9 5

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2030623	PHY0967S1694	Bank of the Philippine Islands	Emerging Markets	Philippines	20/04/2026	Annual	Against	8 3.1,3.14,3.15 3.2
2081916	PLKGHM000017	KGHM Polska Miedz SA	Emerging Markets	Poland	09/06/2026	Annual	Against	14 11f
2087957	PLPZU0000011	Powszechny Zaklad Ubezpieczen SA	Emerging Markets	Poland	18/06/2026	Annual	Against	18
2086800	PLPKO0000016	PKO Bank Polski SA	Emerging Markets	Poland	29/06/2026	Annual	Against	10,15
2062346	ZAE000255915	Absa Group Ltd.	Emerging Markets	South Africa	02/06/2026	Annual	Against	9
2045848	TH0016010009	Kasikornbank Public Co. Ltd.	Emerging Markets	Thailand	10/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2044433	TH0371010Z05	Supalai Public Company Limited	Emerging Markets	Thailand	21/04/2026	Annual	Against	3.2 3.3 3.1
2039716	AED001801011	Dubai Electricity & Water Authority	Emerging Markets	United Arab Emirates	02/04/2026	Annual	Against	10 7
2053504	AEE01569T248	Talabat Holding Plc	Emerging Markets	United Arab Emirates	13/04/2026	Annual	Against	7
2041333	AT0000652011	Erste Group Bank AG	Europe	Austria	17/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2041336	AT0000746409	VERBUND AG	Europe	Austria	21/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2041339	AT0000BAWAG2	BAWAG Group AG	Europe	Austria	22/04/2026	Annual	Against	6
2041345	AT0000908504	Vienna Insurance Group AG	Europe	Austria	22/05/2026	Annual	Against	3
2041453	AT000000STR1	STRABAG SE	Europe	Austria	12/06/2026	Annual	Against	3,4
2041469	AT0000720008	Telekom Austria AG	Europe	Austria	24/06/2026	Annual	Against	6.1 6.2,6.3,6.4
2039590	BE0974349814	Warehouses De Pauw SA	Europe	Belgium	29/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	12 1.2C1
2061704	BE0003739530	UCB SA	Europe	Belgium	30/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	8,2 5
2037709	BE0974464977	Syensqo NV	Europe	Belgium	05/05/2026	Annual	Against	3
2067344	BE0003797140	Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA	Europe	Belgium	07/05/2026	Annual	Against	5.2 6,7.2
2067353	BE0003797140	Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA	Europe	Belgium	07/05/2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For	
2041841	BE0003874915	Fagron NV	Europe	Belgium	11/05/2026	Annual	Against	9,11.2 10 3,7
2066682	BE0003874915	Fagron NV	Europe	Belgium	11/05/2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For	
2039405	BE0003764785	Ackermans & van Haaren NV	Europe	Belgium	26/05/2026	Annual	Against	6,3,7
2035952	BE0974259880	D'Ieteren Group	Europe	Belgium	28/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	2,3 3,4,5 1
2056919	DK0010307958	Jyske Bank A/S	Europe	Denmark	20/04/2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For	
2037699	FI0009007884	Elisa Oyj	Europe	Finland	01/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2037399	FI0009000681	Nokia Oyj	Europe	Finland	09/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2010767	FI4000552500	Sampo Oyj	Europe	Finland	22/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2047120	FR0000125486	VINCI SA	Europe	France	14/04/2026	Annual/Special	All For	
2048193	FR0000120503	Bouygues SA	Europe	France	23/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	4 7,11 15,20
2054232	FR0000130403	Christian Dior SE	Europe	France	23/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	4 7 5 10,12,13,23,24 21,22 18,19,20
2044874	FR0000120644	Danone SA	Europe	France	23/04/2026	Annual/Special	All For	
2046805	FR0000120321	L'Oreal SA	Europe	France	24/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	5
2046379	FR0010208488	ENGIE SA	Europe	France	29/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	15,18
2056831	FR0000065484	Lectra SA	Europe	France	29/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	17 16
2037546	FR0000120578	Sanofi	Europe	France	29/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	10,16
2047117	FR0000131104	BNP Paribas SA	Europe	France	12/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	10,11,14,15,16
2065368	FR0000077919	JCDecaux SE	Europe	France	13/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	7 5 14,16,19 22 24
2046380	FR0000133308	Orange SA	Europe	France	19/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	8,10,15 6
2067854	FR0000073298	Ipsos SA	Europe	France	20/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	6 10,16
2064004	FR0000039299	Bollore SE	Europe	France	27/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	7,8 15 11
2053421	FR0000130809	Societe Generale SA	Europe	France	27/05/2026	Annual/Special	All For	

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2083299	FR001400PFU4	Planisware SA	Europe	France	17/06/2026	Annual/Special	Against	4 7 13
2082144	FR0000071946	Alten SA	Europe	France	18/06/2026	Annual/Special	Against	11
2087699	FR0000031577	Virbac SA	Europe	France	29/06/2026	Annual/Special	Against	6 5 7,9,10,11,14,15,16 17
2039623	DE0005557508	Deutsche Telekom AG	Europe	Germany	01/04/2026	Annual	Against	7.b),10
2039706	DE0005200000	Beiersdorf AG	Europe	Germany	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	4 6
2039652	DE000BAY0017	Bayer AG	Europe	Germany	24/04/2026	Annual	Against	8
2039699	DE0006048408	Henkel AG & Co. KGaA	Europe	Germany	27/04/2026	Annual	Against	5 4
2039641	DE0008430026	Muenchener Rueckversicherungs-Gesellschaft AG	Europe	Germany	29/04/2026	Annual	Against	6
2039656	DE000BASF111	BASF SE	Europe	Germany	30/04/2026	Annual	Against	9 5a 6
2039702	DE0005439004	Continental AG	Europe	Germany	30/04/2026	Annual	Against	8.4 8.1 4.1 12
2039739	DE000KBX1006	Knorr-Bremse AG	Europe	Germany	30/04/2026	Annual	Against	7c 7b 6
2039643	DE0005552004	Deutsche Post AG	Europe	Germany	05/05/2026	Annual	Against	6a 10
2039704	DE0008402215	Hannover Rueck SE	Europe	Germany	06/05/2026	Annual	Against	4a 6
2040201	DE000JST4000	JOST Werke SE	Europe	Germany	07/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2040451	DE0007507501	WashTec AG	Europe	Germany	12/05/2026	Annual	Against	8
2033899	DE000A0WMPJ6	AIXTRON SE	Europe	Germany	13/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2039662	DE0005785604	Fresenius SE & Co. KGaA	Europe	Germany	22/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2040428	DE000SPG1003	Springer Nature AG & Co. KGaA	Europe	Germany	28/05/2026	Annual	Against	5 11 8
2040173	DE000A1K0235	SUSS MicroTec SE	Europe	Germany	03/06/2026	Annual	Against	10
2040271	DE0007461006	PVA TePla AG	Europe	Germany	16/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2051318	GRS831003009	Piraeus Bank SA	Europe	Greece	21/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2038491	GRS003003035	National Bank of Greece SA	Europe	Greece	30/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2035965	GRS830003000	Alpha Bank SA	Europe	Greece	26/06/2026	Annual	Against	9
2053548	IE00B8KQN827	Eaton Corporation plc	Europe	Ireland	22/04/2026	Annual	Against	1e,1h,2
2048108	IE00BF0L3536	AIB Group plc	Europe	Ireland	30/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2047068	IE00028FXN24	Smurfit WestRock Plc	Europe	Ireland	01/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2062143	IE00BJ5FQX74	Uniphar Plc	Europe	Ireland	07/05/2026	Annual	Against	3d,4
2066177	IE00BD6JX574	Glenveagh Properties Plc	Europe	Ireland	15/05/2026	Annual	Against	3,14
2073525	IE00BK9ZQ967	Trane Technologies Plc	Europe	Ireland	04/06/2026	Annual	Against	1g,3
2026381	IT0004776628	Banca Mediolanum SpA	Europe	Italy	16/04/2026	Annual	Against	2.2,4
2036592	IT0005218380	Banco BPM SpA	Europe	Italy	16/04/2026	Annual	Against	7.2 6.1c,6.1f,6.1l,6.1m,6.1n,6.1o,6.1p,6.1q,6.1r,6.1s,6.1t
2019134	IT0004965148	Moncler SpA	Europe	Italy	21/04/2026	Annual	Against	4.1.1,4.2,4.3 7 2.1
2037735	IT0003796171	Poste Italiane SpA	Europe	Italy	27/04/2026	Annual	Against	5.2,6,7 8,10,12
2023584	IT0005453250	El.En. SpA	Europe	Italy	29/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	2.1,2.2
2029221	IT0000072170	FinecoBank SpA	Europe	Italy	29/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	8,9 6.1k,6.1l,6.1m,6.1n,6.1o,6.1p,6.1q
2034734	IT0004810054	Unipol Assicurazioni SpA	Europe	Italy	29/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	0030,0040,0050
2026724	IT0000072618	Intesa Sanpaolo SpA	Europe	Italy	30/04/2026	Annual/Special	All For	
2063284	IT0005239360	UniCredit SpA	Europe	Italy	04/05/2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For	
2019119	IT0005162406	Technogym SpA	Europe	Italy	05/05/2026	Annual/Special	All For	
2031063	IT0003128367	Enel SpA	Europe	Italy	12/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	006B,0070
2036588	IT0005411209	GVS SpA	Europe	Italy	15/05/2026	Annual	Against	6.1,6.2,6.3.2,6.4,6.5,7.1.2,7.2,7.3 3a,3b 5
2056767	IT0003796171	Poste Italiane SpA	Europe	Italy	18/06/2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For	
2085728	IT0003796171	Poste Italiane SpA	Europe	Italy	18/06/2026	Ordinary Shareholders	All For	
2090164	IT0000072170	FinecoBank SpA	Europe	Italy	29/06/2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For	
2049165	LU1778762911	Spotify Technology SA	Europe	Luxembourg	15/04/2026	Annual	Against	6. 4a,4b

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2059966	LU0075646355	Subsea 7 SA	Europe	Luxembourg	12/05/2026	Annual	Against	10. 5. 9.
2043147	LU2598331598	Tenaris SA	Europe	Luxembourg	12/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	6. 8. 10.
2035532	NL0011794037	Koninklijke Ahold Delhaize NV	Europe	Netherlands	08/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2037518	NL0011821202	ING Groep NV	Europe	Netherlands	14/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2040140	NL0000009082	Royal KPN NV	Europe	Netherlands	15/04/2026	Annual	Against	4.
2013756	NL0010273215	ASML Holding NV	Europe	Netherlands	22/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2040149	NL0009269109	Koninklijke Heijmans NV	Europe	Netherlands	29/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2040154	NL0010801007	IMCD NV	Europe	Netherlands	30/04/2026	Annual	Against	6.a. 2.c.
2051807	NL0011872650	Basic-Fit NV	Europe	Netherlands	06/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2039737	NL0000009538	Koninklijke Philips NV	Europe	Netherlands	08/05/2026	Annual	Against	3.e.
2052734	NL0000852523	TKH Group NV	Europe	Netherlands	13/05/2026	Annual	Against	4
2029434	NL0006237562	Arcadis NV	Europe	Netherlands	20/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2013351	NL0011872643	ASR Nederland NV	Europe	Netherlands	20/05/2026	Annual	Against	8c
2056809	NL0006294274	Euronext NV	Europe	Netherlands	20/05/2026	Annual	Against	3.b.
2061511	NL0012059018	EXOR NV	Europe	Netherlands	20/05/2026	Annual	Against	2.b. 6.a. 7.a.,7.b.
2040107	NL0010773842	NN Group NV	Europe	Netherlands	21/05/2026	Annual	Against	10.B. 5.
2044939	NL0000395903	Wolters Kluwer NV	Europe	Netherlands	21/05/2026	Annual	Against	5.a. 2.d. 10.
2039763	NO0010209331	Protector Forsikring ASA	Europe	Norway	09/04/2026	Annual	Against	6.1,6.3 6.2 4.2
2039855	NO0010161896	DNB Bank ASA	Europe	Norway	21/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2039726	NO0010234552	Aker ASA	Europe	Norway	22/04/2026	Annual	Against	10.1 10.2 5,6
2039886	NO0003733800	Orkla ASA	Europe	Norway	23/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2039784	NO0010631567	Sparebank 1 Sor-Norge ASA	Europe	Norway	23/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2039647	NO0010571680	Wallenius Wilhelmsen ASA	Europe	Norway	29/04/2026	Annual	Against	6
2039870	NO0010063308	Telenor ASA	Europe	Norway	19/05/2026	Annual	Against	9,10
2060906	PTJMT0AE0001	Jeronimo Martins SGPS SA	Europe	Portugal	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	3
2057836	ES0130670112	Endesa SA	Europe	Spain	28/04/2026	Annual	Against	10
2059962	ES0113860A34	Banco de Sabadell SA	Europe	Spain	05/05/2026	Annual	Against	6.4 10,13
2058707	ES0137650018	Fluidra SA	Europe	Spain	06/05/2026	Annual	Against	5 6
2058201	ES0167050915	ACS, Actividades de Construccion y Servicios SA	Europe	Spain	07/05/2026	Annual	Against	5 4
2065360	ES0105630315	CIE Automotive SA	Europe	Spain	12/05/2026	Annual	Against	8,9 12
2055129	ES0144580Y14	Iberdrola SA	Europe	Spain	29/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2038143	SE0000667925	Telia Co. AB	Europe	Sweden	09/04/2026	Annual	Against	14.6,15.1
2008099	SE0000190126	Industrivarden AB	Europe	Sweden	13/04/2026	Annual	Against	12.g 12.f 12.b,12.h 12.a,12.e 12.j 16
2012943	SE0000114837	Trelleborg AB	Europe	Sweden	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	13a,13h 13b,13c 15
2039779	SE0007491303	Bravida Holding AB	Europe	Sweden	28/04/2026	Annual	Against	14c 17
2040224	SE0000163594	Securitas AB	Europe	Sweden	29/04/2026	Annual	Against	13

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2039898	SE0000106270	H&M Hennes & Mauritz AB	Europe	Sweden	05/05/2026	Annual	Against	12.7 15,18
2040376	SE0007158910	Alimak Group AB	Europe	Sweden	06/05/2026	Annual	Against	12 15,16,17
2040254	SE0000872095	Swedish Orphan Biovitrum AB	Europe	Sweden	06/05/2026	Annual	Against	15.b,15.c,15.h 15.e 16,17.A1,17.B1,17.C 18
2039900	SE0005190238	Tele2 AB	Europe	Sweden	18/05/2026	Annual	Against	16 15a 15c,15g 18
2040892	SE0023135298	Noba Bank Group AB	Europe	Sweden	21/05/2026	Annual	Against	14d 14a,14e 14c,14h 11,16,17
2042347	CH0003541510	Forbo Holding AG	Europe	Switzerland	02/04/2026	Annual	Against	9 5.2,5.3,5.6,6.1,6.3
2042286	CH0126881561	Swiss Re AG	Europe	Switzerland	10/04/2026	Annual	Against	8 1.2
2034330	CH0030170408	Geberit AG	Europe	Switzerland	15/04/2026	Annual	Against	9 5.1.3 8.1
2033601	CH0244767585	UBS Group AG	Europe	Switzerland	15/04/2026	Annual	Against	11 2
2042279	CH0038863350	Nestle SA	Europe	Switzerland	16/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2042320	CH0100837282	Kardex Holding AG	Europe	Switzerland	30/04/2026	Annual	Against	6 1.2
2042293	CH0025238863	Kuehne + Nagel International AG	Europe	Switzerland	06/05/2026	Annual	Against	4.1a 7.2,8 4.1c 4.1d 4.3a 6 4.1h 4.2
2042295	CH1216478797	DSM-Firmenich AG	Europe	Switzerland	07/05/2026	Annual	Against	8 1.3
2042285	CH0012214059	Holcim Ltd.	Europe	Switzerland	13/05/2026	Annual	Against	1.2,6
2064323	CH0044328745	Chubb Limited	Europe	Switzerland	21/05/2026	Annual	Against	5.2 A 6
2038126	CA9528451052	West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd.	North America	Canada	22/04/2026	Annual/Special	All For	
2040539	US42824C1099	Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company	North America	USA	01/04/2026	Annual	Against	1b,4
2045832	US5260571048	Lennar Corporation	North America	USA	08/04/2026	Annual	Against	1h 4,5
2046784	US2605571031	Dow Inc.	North America	USA	09/04/2026	Annual	Against	1g 1d 5 4
2048273	US8318652091	A. O. Smith Corporation	North America	USA	13/04/2026	Annual	Against	1.1 1.3,3
2045625	US26884L1098	EQT Corporation	North America	USA	14/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2048377	US6153691059	Moodys Corporation	North America	USA	14/04/2026	Annual	Against	1j
2048968	US0640581007	The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation	North America	USA	14/04/2026	Annual	Against	1h,2
2046780	US00724F1012	Adobe Inc.	North America	USA	15/04/2026	Annual	Against	1d 1b,1j,1k,4
2047721	US14448C1045	Carrier Global Corporation	North America	USA	15/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2047887	US86800U3023	Super Micro Computer, Inc.	North America	USA	15/04/2026	Annual	Against	1c 1b 4
2048445	US15189T1079	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	North America	USA	16/04/2026	Annual	Against	1a 1b,1d,2,4
2045311	US40434L1052	HP Inc.	North America	USA	16/04/2026	Annual	Against	1d 4 5
2049706	US4448591028	Humana Inc.	North America	USA	16/04/2026	Annual	Against	1d 5
2049173	US6935061076	PPG Industries, Inc.	North America	USA	16/04/2026	Annual	Against	1d,1h,1l 5

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2043142	US8716071076	Synopsys, Inc.	North America	USA	16/04/2026	Annual	Against	1g 3
2048387	US8825081040	Texas Instruments Incorporated	North America	USA	16/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2047409	US11135F1012	Broadcom Inc.	North America	USA	20/04/2026	Annual	Against	1h,3
2052993	US16119P1084	Charter Communications, Inc.	North America	USA	21/04/2026	Annual	Against	1b,1g,1i,2,3,5
2051073	US25754A2015	Domino's Pizza, Inc.	North America	USA	21/04/2026	Annual	Against	1,3 3 5
2050665	US3167731005	Fifth Third Bancorp	North America	USA	21/04/2026	Annual	Against	1d
2051038	US55261F1049	M&T Bank Corporation	North America	USA	21/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2052194	US55354G1004	MSCI Inc.	North America	USA	21/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2051692	US6658591044	Northern Trust Corporation	North America	USA	21/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2053004	US7445731067	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	North America	USA	21/04/2026	Annual	Against	1j,5
2051327	US9029733048	U.S. Bancorp	North America	USA	21/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2052817	US4461501045	Huntington Bancshares Incorporated	North America	USA	22/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2053776	US1255231003	The Cigna Group	North America	USA	22/04/2026	Annual	Against	1c
2052252	US6934751057	The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.	North America	USA	22/04/2026	Annual	Against	1b 1f
2052007	US8243481061	The Sherwin-Williams Company	North America	USA	22/04/2026	Annual	Against	1f,3 5
2050659	US1746101054	Citizens Financial Group, Inc.	North America	USA	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	1.10
2053760	US2810201077	Edison International	North America	USA	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	1h 4
2045278	US3119001044	Fastenal Company	North America	USA	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	6
2053767	US40412C1018	HCA Healthcare, Inc.	North America	USA	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	1i,3
2052302	US45841N1072	Interactive Brokers Group, Inc.	North America	USA	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	1a 1b 3 4
2046808	US46266C1053	IQVIA Holdings Inc.	North America	USA	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	1b,4,5
2052222	US4456581077	J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc.	North America	USA	23/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2051924	US4781601046	Johnson & Johnson	North America	USA	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	1j
2052818	US7170811035	Pfizer Inc.	North America	USA	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	5
2059047	US9344231041	Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc.	North America	USA	23/04/2026	Special	Against	2
2053814	US0028241000	Abbott Laboratories	North America	USA	24/04/2026	Annual	Against	1.9
2052101	US3841091040	Graco Inc.	North America	USA	24/04/2026	Annual	Against	1a 3
2049739	US8545021011	Stanley Black & Decker, Inc.	North America	USA	24/04/2026	Annual	Against	1g,4
2055197	US1252691001	CF Industries Holdings, Inc.	North America	USA	28/04/2026	Annual	Against	4
2055990	US22052L1044	Corteva, Inc.	North America	USA	28/04/2026	Annual	Against	1k 2
2055205	US29472R1086	Equity LifeStyle Properties, Inc.	North America	USA	28/04/2026	Annual	Against	1,4
2051335	US4592001014	International Business Machines Corporation	North America	USA	28/04/2026	Annual	Against	4 1g 1h 1b
2054398	US89832Q1094	Truist Financial Corporation	North America	USA	28/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2054717	US9256521090	VICI Properties Inc.	North America	USA	28/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2055624	US9497461015	Wells Fargo & Company	North America	USA	28/04/2026	Annual	Against	4 2 5 7,8 1d 1j
2055247	US0584981064	Ball Corporation	North America	USA	29/04/2026	Annual	Against	1f
2055466	US4595061015	International Flavors & Fragrances Inc.	North America	USA	29/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2051095	US3848021040	W.W. Grainger, Inc.	North America	USA	29/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2056437	US2193501051	Corning Incorporated	North America	USA	30/04/2026	Annual	Against	1f 1d,3 2 4
2056623	US3755581036	Gilead Sciences, Inc.	North America	USA	30/04/2026	Annual	Against	6 5
2055200	US37940X1028	Global Payments Inc.	North America	USA	30/04/2026	Annual	Against	1d,2
2055819	US37959E1029	Globe Life Inc.	North America	USA	30/04/2026	Annual	Against	1b 2
2052753	US8330341012	Snap-on Incorporated	North America	USA	30/04/2026	Annual	Against	1.1
2055509	US1720621010	Cincinnati Financial Corporation	North America	USA	02/05/2026	Annual	Against	1,3 3
2056674	US5324571083	Eli Lilly and Company	North America	USA	04/05/2026	Annual	Against	1b 1c,3,6

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2052831	US9553061055	West Pharmaceutical Services, Inc.	North America	USA	04/05/2026	Annual	Against	4
2058490	US1101221083	Bristol-Myers Squibb Company	North America	USA	05/05/2026	Annual	Against	5
2059353	US6819191064	Omnicom Group Inc.	North America	USA	05/05/2026	Annual	Against	1c 1h 2
2060168	US7134481081	PepsiCo, Inc.	North America	USA	06/05/2026	Annual	Against	1k 5
2057881	US12541W2098	C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.	North America	USA	07/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2058497	US1273871087	Cadence Design Systems, Inc.	North America	USA	07/05/2026	Annual	Against	1.1 3
2055460	US5926881054	Mettler-Toledo International Inc.	North America	USA	07/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2054934	US74144T1088	T. Rowe Price Group, Inc.	North America	USA	07/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2057145	US00287Y1091	AbbVie Inc.	North America	USA	08/05/2026	Annual	Against	1a,5
2058555	US14040H1059	Capital One Financial Corporation	North America	USA	08/05/2026	Annual	Against	1e 1g
2058282	US1941621039	Colgate-Palmolive Company	North America	USA	08/05/2026	Annual	Against	1b 5 1e
2067594	US5745991068	Masco Corporation	North America	USA	08/05/2026	Annual	Against	1c 7
2059670	US8807701029	Teradyne, Inc.	North America	USA	08/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2059341	US15135B1017	Centene Corporation	North America	USA	12/05/2026	Annual	Against	4
2060162	US2971781057	Essex Property Trust, Inc.	North America	USA	12/05/2026	Annual	Against	1h
2060085	US45168D1046	IDEXX Laboratories, Inc.	North America	USA	12/05/2026	Annual	Against	6
2062371	US5404241086	Loews Corporation	North America	USA	12/05/2026	Annual	Against	1b
2059481	US6516391066	Newmont Corporation	North America	USA	12/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2059331	US6516391066	Newmont Corporation	North America	USA	12/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2060141	US0079031078	Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.	North America	USA	13/05/2026	Annual	Against	1g 5
2061970	US0268747849	American International Group, Inc.	North America	USA	13/05/2026	Annual	Against	1d 2
2064269	US83088M1027	Skyworks Solutions, Inc.	North America	USA	13/05/2026	Annual	Against	1c 3,8 9
2057139	US00206R1023	AT&T Inc.	North America	USA	14/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2063864	US12008R1077	Builders FirstSource, Inc.	North America	USA	14/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2064372	US1266501006	CVS Health Corporation	North America	USA	14/05/2026	Annual	Against	1i 1m
2057060	US4943681035	Kimberly-Clark Corporation	North America	USA	14/05/2026	Annual	Against	1.13 4 1.12,2
2063379	US6821891057	ON Semiconductor Corporation	North America	USA	14/05/2026	Annual	Against	4
2064256	US5007541064	The Kraft Heinz Company	North America	USA	14/05/2026	Annual	Against	1a 1f 2
2063885	US92556V1061	Viatris Inc.	North America	USA	15/05/2026	Annual	Against	1g
2065200	US0311621009	Amgen Inc.	North America	USA	19/05/2026	Annual	Against	4
2060666	US05722G1004	Baker Hughes Company	North America	USA	19/05/2026	Annual	Against	1.6 2
2064562	US46625H1005	JPMorgan Chase & Co.	North America	USA	19/05/2026	Annual	Against	6 5
2065243	US70450Y1038	PayPal Holdings, Inc.	North America	USA	19/05/2026	Annual	Against	1k 3 6 5
2064275	US9892071054	Zebra Technologies Corporation	North America	USA	19/05/2026	Annual	Against	1b
2066170	US0231351067	Amazon.com, Inc.	North America	USA	20/05/2026	Annual	Against	7 5 1k 3 1h 1c
2063817	US1729674242	Citigroup Inc.	North America	USA	20/05/2026	Annual	Against	1f,3
2065630	US44107P1049	Host Hotels & Resorts, Inc.	North America	USA	20/05/2026	Annual	Against	1.9 3
2064713	US45784P1012	Insulet Corporation	North America	USA	20/05/2026	Annual	Against	1.2 1.1 2
2064763	US74834L1008	Quest Diagnostics Incorporated	North America	USA	20/05/2026	Annual	Against	1j 4
2065834	US8574771031	State Street Corporation	North America	USA	20/05/2026	Annual	Against	4
2066391	US4165151048	The Hartford Insurance Group, Inc.	North America	USA	20/05/2026	Annual	All For	

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2047935	US48251W1045	KKR & Co. Inc.	North America	USA	21/05/2026	Special	Against	2,3,4,5
2067433	US5049221055	Labcorp Holdings Inc.	North America	USA	21/05/2026	Annual	Against	1e 1g 2
2067603	US92343E1029	VeriSign, Inc.	North America	USA	21/05/2026	Annual	Against	1.5 5
2064702	US92343V1044	Verizon Communications Inc.	North America	USA	21/05/2026	Annual	Against	6 5
2062372	US98956P1021	Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc.	North America	USA	22/05/2026	Annual	Against	1b,1h 4
2065844	US58933Y1055	Merck & Co., Inc.	North America	USA	26/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2065182	US2566771059	Dollar General Corporation	North America	USA	28/05/2026	Annual	Against	6 5
2070108	US79466L3024	Salesforce, Inc.	North America	USA	28/05/2026	Annual	Against	1j 5 2
2070075	US0404132054	Arista Networks, Inc.	North America	USA	29/05/2026	Annual	Against	1.3
2072445	US09857L1089	Booking Holdings Inc.	North America	USA	02/06/2026	Annual	Against	1f 1e 5
2070543	US1924461023	Cognizant Technology Solutions Corporation	North America	USA	02/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2074460	US3802371076	GoDaddy Inc.	North America	USA	03/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2074574	US69608A1088	Palantir Technologies Inc.	North America	USA	03/06/2026	Annual	Against	1,4,3,5,6
2073262	US23918K1088	DaVita Inc.	North America	USA	04/06/2026	Annual	Against	1g
2074320	US9311421039	Walmart Inc.	North America	USA	04/06/2026	Annual	Against	6,7,8
2075272	US02079K3059	Alphabet Inc.	North America	USA	05/06/2026	Annual	Against	1g,1i 11,12 6,13,14 1j,3,4,7
2077668	US45337C1027	Incyte Corporation	North America	USA	08/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.2 2
2077647	US09062X1037	Biogen Inc.	North America	USA	09/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2078636	US34959J1088	Fortive Corporation	North America	USA	09/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2080641	US8725401090	The TJX Companies, Inc.	North America	USA	09/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2072721	US90384S3031	Ulta Beauty, Inc.	North America	USA	09/06/2026	Annual	Against	1h 5
2080317	US9344231041	Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc.	North America	USA	09/06/2026	Annual	Against	3 1.3,1.5,1.9
2075385	US20030N1019	Comcast Corporation	North America	USA	10/06/2026	Annual	Against	3 1.1,1.2,1.5,4
2077736	US31620M1062	Fidelity National Information Services, Inc.	North America	USA	10/06/2026	Annual	Against	1h 2
2076321	US87612E1064	Target Corporation	North America	USA	10/06/2026	Annual	Against	1e,1i,5,6
2079607	US3687361044	Generac Holdings Inc.	North America	USA	11/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.2
2080883	US0865161014	Best Buy Co., Inc.	North America	USA	12/06/2026	Annual	Against	1m
2078487	US34959E1091	Fortinet, Inc.	North America	USA	12/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.3,1.4 1.7 3
2081069	US2567461080	Dollar Tree, Inc.	North America	USA	16/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2076283	US8725901040	T-Mobile US, Inc.	North America	USA	16/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.5 1.2 1.13 3
2082076	US98138H1014	Workday, Inc.	North America	USA	16/06/2026	Annual	Against	1a 1d 3,4,5 6 7
2082413	US0527691069	Autodesk, Inc.	North America	USA	17/06/2026	Annual	Against	1e 1b,5
2082048	US22788C1053	CrowdStrike Holdings, Inc.	North America	USA	17/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.2 4
2080725	US2786421030	eBay Inc.	North America	USA	17/06/2026	Annual	Against	4
2079664	US30212P3038	Expedia Group, Inc.	North America	USA	17/06/2026	Annual	Against	1d 1g,1h
2082327	US9699041011	Williams-Sonoma, Inc.	North America	USA	18/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.7 1.4 2
2084342	US67066G1040	NVIDIA Corporation	North America	USA	24/06/2026	Annual	Against	1d,2,4

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers
2079638	US87165B1035	Synchrony Financial	North America	USA	24/06/2026	Annual	All For	
2084738	US5010441013	The Kroger Co.	North America	USA	25/06/2026	Annual	Against	1e,3
2064587	GG00BQZCBZ44	Shurgard Self Storage Ltd.	United Kingdom	Guernsey	13/05/2026	Annual	Against	7.2 7.7 11
2054675	JE00BTDN8H13	Aptiv Plc	United Kingdom	Jersey	29/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2049826	GB00BP9LHF23	Schroders Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	16/04/2026	Annual	Against	5
2040854	GB00BP9LHF23	Schroders Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	16/04/2026	Court	All For	
2040858	GB00BP9LHF23	Schroders Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	16/04/2026	Special	All For	
2047101	GB00B0744B38	Bunzl Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	22/04/2026	Annual	Against	7
2045573	GB00B0LCW083	Hikma Pharmaceuticals Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	6
2041089	GB00B2B0DG97	RELX Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	3
2056803	GB0008481250	ME Group International Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	24/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2041277	GB00BM8PJY71	NatWest Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	28/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2048764	GB00B02J6398	Admiral Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	29/04/2026	Annual	All For	
2053551	GB0006776081	Pearson Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	01/05/2026	Annual	Against	16 15
2048975	GB00BN7SWP63	GSK Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	06/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2054575	GB0009223206	Smith & Nephew plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	06/05/2026	Annual	Against	16 21 3 2
2045498	GB0005405286	HSBC Holdings Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	08/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2060571	GB00BGDT3G23	Rightmove Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	08/05/2026	Annual	Against	3
2067841	GB00B63QSB39	Greggs Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	13/05/2026	Annual	Against	13
2052954	GB00BVZK7T90	Unilever Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	13/05/2026	Annual	Against	3
2044219	GB0006928617	The UNITE Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	15/05/2026	Annual	All For	
2070690	GB00B2QPKJ12	Fresnillo Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	19/05/2026	Annual	Against	9 11 4,5
2052750	GB00B4YZN328	Coats Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	20/05/2026	Annual	Against	5 3
2058645	GB0032089863	Next Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	21/05/2026	Annual	Against	2 3
2058252	GB00BSZBP530	Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	21/05/2026	Annual	Against	2
2051651	GB00B3FLWH99	Bodycote Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	27/05/2026	Annual	Against	7 19
2034766	GB0007099541	Prudential Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	28/05/2026	Annual	Against	7,9,10,11 2,3
2085233	GB00BLGZ9862	Tesco Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	18/06/2026	Annual	Abstain	7
2084528	GB00B1KJJ408	Whitbread Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	18/06/2026	Annual	All For	

Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
		1
Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		2
		2
Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] 2- EOS manual override.	4.2	1
Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
	1.1,1.2	1
"Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]" Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
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Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
		1
Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
		1
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Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1]Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
Concerns related to the level of board independence in the nomination and governance, audit, and compensation committees not meeting the threshold outlined in our policy that best protects minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructureGL1] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1]		1
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Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
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Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
		1
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Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently robust policy to prohibit the hedging of equity-based awards by executives together with strict controls over pledging of shares.[Remuneration11] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
		1
Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[BiodiversityUS1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
Cumulative/slate voting in favour of individual candidates/slates.[DirectorElection2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
		1
Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] The proposed resolution bundles the election of multiple directors in a single vote, which restricts shareholder rights by inhibiting the ability for investors to indicate their individual preferences.[DirectorElection3]		1

Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] The proposed resolution bundles the election of multiple directors in a single vote, which restricts shareholder rights by inhibiting the ability for investors to indicate their individual preferences.[DirectorElection3]		1
Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1]		1
		1
Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]		1
Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
Concerns that the proposal will introduce or perpetuate diminished minority shareholder rights.[ShareholderRights3] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1]		1
Concerns that the proposal will introduce or perpetuate diminished minority shareholder rights.[ShareholderRights3]		1
Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that the proposal will introduce or perpetuate diminished minority shareholder rights.[ShareholderRights3]		1
		1
Concern that the Chair and CEO role are combined, which can lead to a lack of independent oversight of management, particularly when insufficiently balanced by the presence of a Lead Independent Director with adequate powers to ensure the board may act independently of the Chair in certain circumstances.[IndividualDirector2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		2
		2
Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1]		1
Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1]		1
		2
		1
Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
		1
Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
		1
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		1
	7,8	1
Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1]		1
Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Shareholder proposal does not promote appropriate accountability or incentivisation as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes. We believe these shareholder rights are best practice corporate governance that ties to directly to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal3] Shareholder proposal would not result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and so would not be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal2]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]	9,11	1
		1
Cumulative/slate voting in favour of individual candidates/slates.[DirectorElection2]		1
Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1]		2
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
		1
		2
		1
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Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1]		1
Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1]		1
		1
Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]		1
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Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1]		1

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Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
		1
Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]		1
Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1]		1
		1
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Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
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Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
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Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
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Concern that there is insufficient evidence to justify that the related party transaction is sufficiently in the interests of the company.[DirectorElection4] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal introduces anti-takeover measures which may prevent an offer to acquire shares being presented to long-term shareholders.[ShareholderRights2]		1
Concern that there is insufficient evidence to justify that the related party transaction is sufficiently in the interests of the company.[DirectorElection4] Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
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Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]	6,8	1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
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Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal introduces anti-takeover measures which may prevent an offer to acquire shares being presented to long-term shareholders.[ShareholderRights2] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1] Concerns that the proposal introduces anti-takeover measures which may prevent an offer to acquire shares being presented to long-term shareholders.[ShareholderRights2]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]		1
Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal introduces anti-takeover measures which may prevent an offer to acquire shares being presented to long-term shareholders.[ShareholderRights2]		1
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Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
Concern that there is insufficient evidence to justify that the related party transaction is sufficiently in the interests of the company.[DirectorElection4] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal introduces anti-takeover measures which may prevent an offer to acquire shares being presented to long-term shareholders.[ShareholderRights2]		1
Concerns that the proposal will introduce or perpetuate diminished minority shareholder rights.[ShareholderRights3]		1
Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1]		1
Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns that there is insufficient consideration of climate change in the audit and account by the board, which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3] Concerns that the proposal will introduce or perpetuate diminished minority shareholder rights.[ShareholderRights3]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
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Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
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Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns that the proposal will introduce or perpetuate diminished minority shareholder rights.[ShareholderRights3]		1
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Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1]		1
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Concerns related to non-audit fees being greater than 50% of audit-related fees, which may adversely influence the independence of the audit, based on a potential conflict of interest in protecting material non-audit fees.[Auditor2]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of share options.[RemunerationGL2]		1
Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Cumulative/slate voting in favour of individual candidates/slates.[DirectorElection2]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Cumulative/slate voting in favour of individual candidates/slates.[DirectorElection2]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
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Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
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Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal supports multiple class share structures with unequal voting rights which limits the interests of minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights4]		2

Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]		1
Concern that the Chair and CEO role are combined, which can lead to a lack of independent oversight of management, particularly when insufficiently balanced by the presence of a Lead Independent Director with adequate powers to ensure the board may act independently of the Chair in certain circumstances.[IndividualDirector2] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] The proposed resolution bundles the election of multiple directors in a single vote, which restricts shareholder rights by inhibiting the ability for investors to indicate their individual preferences.[DirectorElection3] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal introduces anti-takeover measures which may prevent an offer to acquire shares being presented to long-term shareholders.[ShareholderRights2]		1
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Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
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Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
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Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6]		1
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Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]	2.d.	1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
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Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
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Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
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Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
	12,16	1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1]Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
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Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
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Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]		1
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Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
	1.2	1
Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executiveshareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] EOS manual override, see analyst note		1
		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]	3	2
Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		1
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation (omnibus stock plan) due to the development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders. Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently. Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors		1
Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1]		1
	1c,1f,2	1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
Concern that the CEO/Chair has insufficient time to dedicate to their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
		1
Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3] Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1]		1
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		2
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1

Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10]		1
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
		1
		1
		2
Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1]		1
		1
		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		2
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		2
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]		2
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
		1
Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1]	1f,3	1
Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]	1.8,1.9,2	2
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1]		2
Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]	1e,2	1
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors. oncern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions. oncern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions. 2-Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation. oncerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.		2
		2
		1
Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently. Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors. Shareholder proposal promotes actions that should help achieve long-term value creation while safeguarding shareholder interests. Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal. oncern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions. 2-Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions. 3-Concern that the Chair and CEO role are combined, which can lead to a lack of independent oversight of management, particularly when insufficiently balanced by the presence of a Lead Independent Director with adequate powers to ensure the board may act independently of the Chair in certain circumstances. oncerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders. 2-Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.	1c	1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
		1
		1
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that severance pay for a Named Executive Officer is inappropriately high with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS5]Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
Shareholder proposal would result in material additonal disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Pay appears misaligned to value to shareholders, based on analysis of Total Shareholder Return performance and consideration of CEO pay relative to company peers.[RemunerationUS1]		1
Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6]		1
Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
EOS manual override. Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1

Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concern that the combined CEO/Chair has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		1
		1
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]		1
		1
	1g	2
Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions. Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value. oncern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions. 2-Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.		1
Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
	1b,2	1
Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]		1
Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]	1c	1
Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6]		1
		1
		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		1
		1
		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] 2- Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6] Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1]		1
Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] 2- Concerns relating to indicators of the overall performance of the company and its prospects for future performance, based on an assessment of the board's oversight of management of long-term strategy, operational effectiveness, corporate culture, human capital management, suppliers, customers and wider communities upon which the company's long-term health depends.[CompanyPerformance1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the recent use of one-time awards with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[Remuneration7] 2- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the significant use of qualitative metrics.[RemunerationGL3] 3- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
EOS manual override. Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]	1h	1
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		1
Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
hareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6] hareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7] oncern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] oncerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] oncerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1] 2-Concerns related to board oversight and the necessary evaluation of the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time to determine the board fit for purpose [BoardEvaluationUS1] oncerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1] 2-Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
		1

Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
Concerns that the proposal will introduce or perpetuate diminished minority shareholder rights.[ShareholderRights3]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
	1j,1m	1
Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		1
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
oncerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] 2-Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders. 3-[Remuneration5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]	2	1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1] Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10]		1
		1
		1
Shareholder proposal would result in material additional disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]	1j	1
EOS manual override. Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7] Shareholder proposal would result in material additonal disclosures that would be decision-useful to investors and would be an efficient use of company resources.[ShareholderProposal10] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]	1d,1h,5	1
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]		1
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Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to a perceived lack of response to relatively low shareholder support on remuneration-related proposals.[Remuneration9] 2- Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the recent use of one-time awards with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[Remuneration7] 3- Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7] 4- Concerns that severance pay for a Named Executive Officer is inappropriately high with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS5] 5- Pay appears misaligned to value to shareholders, based on analysis of Total Shareholder Return performance and consideration of CEO pay relative to company peers.[RemunerationUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5]		1
Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]. Pay appears misaligned to value to shareholders, based on analysis of Total Shareholder Return performance and consideration of CEO pay relative to company peers.[RemunerationUS1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]	1l,2	1
Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		1
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Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructureUS2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns relating to the attendance of a director, which appears to be lower than 75% of the relevant board and committee meetings expected annually without clear justification of their absence.[BoardStructure2] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
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Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] 2- Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to board oversight and the necessary evaluation of the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time to determine the board fit for purpose [BoardEvaluationUS1]	1k	1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]	1g	1

Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
		1
Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1]		1
Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns relating to the attendance of a director, which appears to be lower than 75% of the relevant board and committee meetings expected annually without clear justification of their absence.[BoardStructure2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
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Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]		1
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Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		2
Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUK7]	2	1
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Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUK7] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
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Concerns related to board composition as indicated by failure to meet targets set out in UK FCA listing rules on diversity and inclusion Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUK7] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of more than two types of concurrent variable pay arrangements.[RemunerationUK6] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUK7] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of time-based restricted shares.[RemunerationUK1]		1
	2	1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUK9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUK8]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUK9]		1
Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUK7]	2,7	1
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Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationGL9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationGL8]		1
Concerns related to board composition as indicated by failure to meet targets set out in UK FCA listing rules on diversity and inclusion Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationGL9]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationGL8] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the overreliance on total shareholder returns (TSR).[RemunerationGL5]		1
Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of share options. Concerns that compensation for CEO is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds		1
Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of share options.[RemunerationGL2]		1
Concerns related to board composition as indicated by failure to meet targets set out in UK FCA listing rules on diversity and inclusion.[BoardCompositionGL5] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationGL7]		1
Withdrawn resolution.		1
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